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In 1996, the Southwest economy
is likely to see its 10th consecutive
year of economic expansion. Slug-
gish overall growth in the U.S.
economy and some tightness in
regional labor markets, however,
could restrain growth. After grow-
ing at an annual rate of 3 percent in
1995,
1 combined nonfarm employ-
ment in Louisiana, New Mexico and
Texas should slow to about 2.4
percent in 1996. Of the three states,
New Mexico is likely to have the
fastest rate of growth, followed by
Texas and Louisiana.
Southwest Construction
Activity Strong in 1995
While the sources of strength
varied throughout the region, the
construction sector generally was
strong in all three states (Chart 2).
The residential sector benefited
from lean inventories at the start of
the year and a sharp decline in mort-
gage rates throughout the year.
While nationally the average value
of residential construction was








 he Southwest economy’s ex-
 pansion during 1995 nearly
matched its historical average and
remained strong relative to the
national average (Chart 1). All three
states in the region—Louisiana,
New Mexico and Texas—benefited
from strength in the construction
sector. Strong growth in the
maquiladora industries and in
exports to countries other than
Mexico allowed Texas to avoid the
potentially large negative effects of
the peso devaluation. The gaming
industry remained the key source
of activity in the Louisiana economy.
New Mexico continued to be pro-
pelled forward by expansions in
high-tech manufacturing.
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Tax Reform: Is the Time





Policy in a Changing
World Economy2
and 1.4 percent in Louisiana. Non-
residential contract values also
increased, particularly in Louisiana,
where the retail sector saw steady
growth and a major flood in New
Orleans triggered construction
activity.
Texas Shakes Off Peso Effects
Texas nonfarm employment
slowed from a strong 4.5-percent
growth rate in 1994 to a more
moderate rate of 3.2 percent in
1995. Employment growth in 1995
was equal to its historical average
and was stronger than national
growth of 1.4 percent. The strength
of the Texas economy in 1995 was
somewhat surprising in light of the
peso devaluation and ensuing
sharp recession in Mexico. Because
exports to Mexico represent about
40 percent of  Texas exports and
Mexican shoppers are responsible
for much of the retail activity along
the Texas border, events in Mexico
can have a significant impact on
the Texas economy.
Although the Mexican peso’s
devaluation hit the border retail
industry hard, strength in the
maquiladora industry offset much
of the blow. The maquiladora
companies on the Mexican side of
the border, whose budgets are
dollar-denominated but whose
costs are in pesos, received a boost
from the devaluation. The thriving
maquiladora industry resulted in
greater warehousing, distribution
and manufacturing needs on the
Texas side of the border. Federally
mandated intrastate trucking de-
regulation, which began in January
1995, also added some stimulus to
the region. The deregulation put
downward pressure on trucking
rates in the state, stimulating de-
mand for warehouse space along
the border and throughout the
state. The increased demand for
warehouses and other commercial
and industrial space led to a surge
in construction activity that offset
much of the decline in the retail
sector (Chart 3).
While the peso devaluation
resulted in a significant decline in
exports to Mexico, a surge in ex-
ports to other countries largely
offset the reduction. While exports
to Mexico declined at an annual
rate of 13.8 percent during the first
three quarters of 1995, Texas ex-
ports to other countries increased at
an annual rate of 23.1 percent,
resulting in an overall export gain
of 8.4 percent (Chart 4).
The petrochemical industry has
been particularly successful in
shifting export markets for its
products. While exports of chemi-
cal and allied products from Texas
to Mexico slowed sharply during
the first three quarters of 1995, total
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44 percent. The value of chemical
and allied product exports in the
first three quarters of 1995 was
$11.1 billion, which led all other
industries and represented 22
percent of the value of total Texas
exports.
Electric and electronic equipment
manufacturers in Texas were also
successful at shifting exports. A
worldwide surge in demand for
semiconductors and telecommuni-
cations equipment allowed Texas
manufacturers of these products to
compensate for reduced demand
from Mexico with increased ship-
ments to countries around the
world. Although Mexican exports
have been an important source of
strength for Texas electric and elec-
tronic equipment manufacturers,
2
employment and exports in this
industry accelerated in 1995 despite
the reduced demand from Mexico.
The growth in the electronics
industry contributed to Texas high-
tech industries’ overall strength.
While the share of high-tech indus-
tries in the state is about the same
as the national average, Texas’
employment growth in the high-
tech sector over the past six years
has been twice as strong as the
nation’s.
3 Texas’ strongest relative
performance has been in computer-
and telecommunications-related
industries such as computer, semi-
conductor, cellular phone manufac-
turing and service firms that provide
programming and data processing.
While the monthly employment
data are too aggregated to measure
recent growth in the high-tech
sectors, anecdotal evidence and
movements in broader employment
categories suggest that the high-




The Driver in Louisiana
Employment growth in Louisiana
slowed from a strong 5.1-percent
rate of growth in 1994 to a more
moderate pace of 1.9 percent in
1995. Employment growth in 1995
was just slightly below its historical
average rate of 2.1 percent. The
gaming industry, despite some
setbacks in 1995, remained the
major driving force behind growth
in the Louisiana economy. After
rapid expansion in 1994, the
gaming industry slowed in 1995
as two riverboat casinos and one
temporary land-based casino in
New Orleans closed their doors.
Also, plans for a permanent land-
based casino in New Orleans were
put on hold. Even with these set-
backs, however, employment
in the amusement industry in
Louisiana increased 31.1 percent
in 1995 after growing 64.3 percent
in 1994 (Chart 5 ).
The energy industry was also a
positive force in the Louisiana eco-
nomy in 1995. Improvements in
offshore drilling techniques and
strong expectations about future
natural gas consumption resulted in
a December-to-December gain of
15.3 percent in the rotary rig count,
which indicates oil and gas explo-
ration activity. Employment in oil
and gas extraction increased at an
annual rate of 2.6 percent through
the first 10 months of the year.
Increased profit margins and ex-
ports for petrochemicals led to
continued strong capital expansion
in this industry throughout the
Texas/Louisiana Gulf Coast region
in 1995.
High-Tech Industries Fuel
Strong Growth in New Mexico
New Mexico nonfarm employ-
ment increased 4.7 percent in 1995,
only slightly less than the state’s
strong 5.1-percent growth rate in
1994. In 1995 and for the fourth
consecutive year, New Mexico’s
growth surpassed its historical
average of 3.3 percent. While Texas
businesses were concerned about
the impact of the peso devaluation
in 1995, businesses in New Mexico
worried about how downsizing in
the defense sector would affect
employment at the two national
labs, Sandia and Los Alamos. Em-
ployment at Los Alamos declined
by about 1,000 jobs, while Sandia
experienced only slight employ-
ment losses.
Job losses at the two national
labs have been more than offset by
strength in New Mexico’s high-tech
industries. High-tech firms such as
Intel, Motorola, Philips Semicon-
ductor and Intuit have had an im-
portant impact on growth in the
New Mexican economy. While
high-tech jobs represent about 3.1
percent of total U.S. employment,
high-tech employment in New
Mexico represents about 5.4 per-
cent of total jobs. Announced ex-
pansions at many of the large
high-tech firms in the state and
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gories suggest that the New Mexi-
can high-tech sector grew strongly
in 1995. As a rough measure of
high-tech growth, 1995 employ-
ment increased 12.1 percent in
electric and electronic equipment
manufacturing and 17.9 percent in
business services (Chart 6 ).
Other sources of strength in New
Mexico include expansions in bus
manufacturing, food processing and
retail trade. An important source of
weakness in New Mexico in 1995
was a decline in the mining sector.
Employment in both mineral min-
ing and oil and gas extraction
declined. The devaluation of the
Mexican peso also had a negative
effect on the New Mexico economy,
although total exports and exports
to Mexico represent a much smaller
share of the economy in New
Mexico than in Texas.
5
Southwest Economy’s
Growth Likely to Slow in 1996
While growth should remain
positive in Louisiana, New Mexico
and Texas, a sluggish national
economy and other factors may
slow the region’s growth in 1996.
In late 1995, business contacts in
Texas reported a significant increase
in labor market tightness across a
wide range of occupations. The
market for skilled workers—such
as mechanics, electricians, machin-
ists, engineers and software devel-
opers—remained tight. Contacts
also noted that wages were being
bid up for accountants and lawyers
from top-tier schools. Several con-
tacts also noted difficulty finding
lower skilled workers with basic
reading, writing, math and commu-
nications skills. Slow U.S. growth
and the apparent mismatch between
the skills of the unemployed and
the skills demanded by the growing
industries in the state may hinder
growth in Texas. Recent movements
in the Texas leading index suggest
that growth in Texas nonfarm
employment will likely slow from
3.2 percent in 1995 to 2.4 percent
in 1996.
Reduced construction activity
may result in slower growth in the
Louisiana economy. Although
gaming activity is likely to remain
level in 1996, subsiding expecta-
tions about its profitability should
diminish capital investment. A
colder than normal winter would
bode well for natural gas producers
in the state, who are already ben-
efiting from improved offshore
drilling technology.
After growing in excess of 4.5
percent for three consecutive years,
nonfarm employment will probably
slow somewhat in New Mexico in
1996. Construction activity is likely
to slow from the strong pace in
1995, due to a reduction in high-
tech capital expansions. Continued
declines in defense spending




I wish to thank Loren Scott at Louisiana
State University and Andrew Krikelas at
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta for
helpful discussions about the Louisiana
economy and Brian McDonald and
Lawrence Waldman at the University of
New Mexico for information on the
New Mexico economy.
1 In this article, 1995 employment growth
refers to the annualized rate of growth
from December 1994 to October 1995,
the most recent data available. All data
used are seasonally adjusted. The state
employment data are adjusted using the
Berger/Phillips two-step technique, and
the Texas employment data is bench-
marked through March 1994. These
employment adjustments are described
in the July/August 1993 issue of South-
west Economy.
2 In Issue 1, 1995, of Southwest Economy,
Lori Taylor and Rhonda Harris find that
the electronics and electric equipment
industry is the third most sensitive Texas
manufacturing industry to changes in
the value of the Mexican peso.
3 For the definition of high-tech industries
and a description of their importance to
the Texas economy, see D’Ann M.
Petersen and Michelle Thomas in “From
Crude Oil to Computer Chips,” South-
west Economy, Issue 6, 1995.
4 For example, employment increased at
an annual rate of 5.9 percent in electric
and electronic equipment manufactur-
ing, 8.7 percent in nonelectrical equip-
ment and computer manufacturing, and
9.8 percent in business services. While
each of these employment categories
contains some industries that are not
classified as high-tech, it is likely that
the high-tech industries in these catego-
ries are responsible for much of the
overall growth. Although the high-tech
component of business services is small,
anecdotal evidence suggests that high-
tech industries are responsible for much
of the growth in temporary employment
agencies, which is a large share of
business services.
5 In 1992, total exports as a share of
nominal gross state product was 12 per-
cent in Texas and 1.2 percent in New
Mexico. Also, 1994 exports to Mexico
represented 40 percent of Texas exports




Surges in New Mexico




















more vulnerable to economic down-
turns; it slows economic growth.
The Consumption Tax
The principal alternative to an
income tax is a consumption tax.
Consumption taxes encourage
saving and investment by deferring
taxes on income until that income
is spent. They make moot a host of
complex issues concerning depre-
ciation schedules and the timing of
capital gains. Furthermore, a house-
hold’s wealth and well-being are
more directly tied to its consump-
tion spending than to its income.
Three alternative versions of the
consumption tax have been proposed.
Two of the proposals can be de-
scribed as direct taxes on consumer
purchases—the national sales tax
and the flat tax. The third proposal,
known as the unlimited savings allow-
ance (USA) tax, exploits the principle
that income must either be saved or
consumed by taxing the difference
between income and savings.
Although equivalent in spirit, the
proposals differ in important details.
Before discussing the likely economic
consequences of replacing the in-
come tax with a consumption tax, it
may therefore be helpful to review
the distinguishing characteristics of
the alternative plans.
n the eyes of many Americans,
our income tax system is overly
complex, basically unfair and—in
short—fatally flawed. At least half
the citizens surveyed in recent
public opinion polls would support
radical reform.
They have a point. Although
length is not necessarily synonymous
with complexity, the U.S. income
tax code now has more than 700
times as many words as the U.S.
Constitution. Furthermore, the costs
of complying with the individual
income tax code are high and rising
(Chart 1). Estimates of the compli-
ance costs associated with the
corporate income tax are even
higher, ranging from about 50
percent to more than 100 percent
of the revenue collected. In other
words, the sum the average firm
pays to keep track of tax-related
information may exceed what it
pays in taxes.
The complexity of the tax code
feeds public suspicion that the tax
system is unfair. Many taxpayers
would agree with Nobel Prize win-
ning economists Milton Friedman
and James Buchanan that much of
the system’s complexity results
from politicians’ trading tax prefer-
ences for campaign contributions.
Economists’ training leads them
to focus more on the tax system’s
inefficiencies than its complexity
and unfairness (though the three
problems are closely related). Here
too, the U.S. income tax code falls
short. A striking example of ineffi-
ciency in the income tax code is its
unequal treatment of income from
different sources. Under current law,
wage and interest income is taxed
only once—at the individual level.
Meanwhile, profits are taxed twice—
first at the corporate level then
again at the individual level. For
profits that are distributed as divi-
dends, the top combined marginal
tax rate can exceed 65 percent.
This heavy taxation of dividends and
capital gains discourages saving
and entrepreneurship; it encourages
firms to use debt finance rather
than equity finance, making them
I
“The sum the average






The Rising Cost of
Complying with U.S. Tax Codes
Costs as a percentage of revenue
NOTE: Compliance costs include the resources that the
Internal Revenue Service expends in enforcing the
tax laws as well as the costs that taxpayers incur in
filling out tax forms.
SOURCES: Joel B. Slemrod, as quoted in Business
Week, January 9, 1995, and James L. Payne,
Costly Returns, (Lanham, Md.: Institute of

















The National Sales Tax. Represen-
tative Bill Archer (R-Texas) and
Senator Richard Lugar (R-Indiana)
argue that consumption spending
should be taxed directly. A national
sales tax on retail purchases would
be one such strategy. An equivalent
measure would be to impose a tax
at each stage of production on the
difference between sales revenue
and payments made to other busi-
nesses for materials, equipment and
supplies. Such a sales tax is called a
value-added tax, or VAT. Most sales
tax proposals would exempt food
and medicine to reduce the burden
of taxation on the poor. All other
goods and services would be taxed.
Economists estimate that the sales
tax rate would have to be at least
21 percent to raise as much rev-
enue as the current income tax.
An attractive feature of a national
sales tax is that even those with
illegal sources of income would
pay taxes with every purchase. In
the same vein, a sales tax is anony-
mous: no one need know how much
money the taxpayer makes or where
it comes from. Another advantage
is that the sales tax concept is
familiar and easy to understand.
The proposal does have draw-
backs, however. A 21-percent sales
tax levied at the retail level would
invite widespread under-the-counter
sales. The VAT approach would
reduce the incentive to cheat by
taking many small bites instead of
one large one. However, the costs of
complying with a VAT would be
extremely burdensome to small
businesses. Moreover, because taxes
would be hidden in the prices con-
sumers pay rather than transparent
as with the sales tax, a VAT could
be an invitation to tax increases.
The Flat Tax. Representative
Richard Armey (R-Texas) proposes
a modified VAT known as the flat
tax. Under a VAT, firms pay tax on
their sales less the sum of their pur-
chases from other businesses. The
flat tax would work in exactly the
same way, except each firm’s
employees would be paid with pre-
tax dollars, and employees would
write checks to the government for
the taxes due on the wage compo-
nent of value added. In effect, the
flat tax treats each worker as an
independent contractor. This differ-
ence in the treatment of wages has
two important benefits. First, taxes
wouldn’t be hidden, as they are
under a standard VAT. Second, the
flat tax approach would allow a
certain amount of each individual’s
wages to be exempted from taxa-
tion ($13,000 for singles, $26,000
for couples, plus $5,300 per depen-
dent under the Armey proposal),
making it easy to limit the tax
burden on the poor.
On the negative side, flat tax
opponents claim that people with-
out labor income would pay no
tax. The statement is only superfi-
cially true: nonwage income would
be taxed before it is distributed, at
the same rate as wage income.
Representative Armey proposes
that the initial tax rate be 20 per-
cent. Most economists think the
rate would need to be closer to 23
percent to replace the revenue from
the current income tax.
The USA Tax. Senators Sam Nunn
(D-Georgia), Pete V. Domenici
(R-New Mexico) and Bob Kerrey
(D-Nebraska) propose a consump-
tion tax disguised as an income tax.
The key difference between the cur-
rent income tax and their USA tax
is that under the USA plan net new
saving would be fully deductible
from income for tax purposes.
Households would continue to re-
port wage, dividend, interest and
capital gains income on their tax
returns. They would continue to
deduct home mortgage interest and
charitable contributions. A modest
deduction for higher education ex-
penses would be introduced. The
value of fringe benefits such as em-
ployer-provided health insurance
would be included in household
taxable income for the first time.
Tax rates on personal income would
be graduated—rising from 19 per-
cent to 40 percent—while the cor-
porate income tax would be scrapped
and replaced with an 11-percent
“Once enacted, any of
these three proposals
would likely have
a positive effect on
saving and investment.”7
VAT. Tax rates would be higher
than under the other reform propo-
sals, partly because the USA tax
would retain more deductions than
the other proposals and partly be-
cause Social Security benefits, in
effect, would be financed from gen-
eral revenue under the USA plan.
Of the three reform proposals,
the USA tax is the only one that
uses the tax code to stimulate
investment in education as well as
in plant and equipment. It is also
the only reform proposal that
incorporates Social Security taxes.
On the minus side, the USA tax
would do little to simplify the tax
code. It would continue the current
subsidy to home ownership and
actually would increase the incen-
tive for home ownership by not
counting new home equity loans
as taxable dissaving. Additionally,
households would be able to accu-
mulate up to $35,000 in nonmort-
gage debt without tax liability. Con-
sequently, the USA tax would pro-
vide less overall stimulus to saving
and investment than the other tax
reform proposals reviewed here.
Likely Effects of Switching
To a Consumption Tax
Once enacted, any of these three
proposals would likely have a posi-
tive effect on saving and investment,
for two reasons. First, because they
are consumption taxes, each pro-
posal defers the taxation of income
until the income is spent. Second,
each proposal eliminates the current
system’s punitive taxation of divi-
dends and capital gains. As shown
in the right-hand column of Table
1, increased saving and investment
will eventually pay off in a higher
capital stock, higher real wages and
greater consumption. Laurence
Kotlikoff of Boston University has
estimated that switching to a con-
sumption tax would boost the
nation’s stock of plant and equip-
ment by nearly 27 percent after 20
years. A 27-percent increase in the
capital stock would mean nearly
10-percent increases in real wages
and real output, relative to their
level under an income tax.
In the near term—described in
the left-hand column of Table 1—
greater investment can be achieved
only at the expense of consumption.
So, in the years immediately follow-
ing tax reform, consumption would
be lower than it would have been
under the current system.
On a cautionary note, the pros-
pect of tax reform may have a per-
verse effect on the economy in the
prereform period. Knowing that
investment would soon be receiv-
ing more favorable tax treatment,
people would be likely to spend
more on consumption and defer
investment in the months before
the new tax law takes effect.
The Effects on Interest Rates. The
real yield on short-term bonds
moves opposite from the capital
stock, all else being constant. Since
the capital stock would gradually
increase under a consumption tax,
relative to its level under an income
tax, the real yields on short-term
corporate and Treasury debt would
gradually decline after tax reform,
eventually stabilizing at about
three-fourths their current levels.
The time path of short-term mu-
nicipal bond yields would be quite
different. Municipal bonds currently
have an advantage relative to corpo-
rate and Treasury bonds because
they are tax-exempt. Under either a
national sales tax or the Armey flat
tax, this advantage would disappear:
all bonds would be treated the same.
After the implementation of tax re-
form, the yield on municipal bonds
would jump upward to match the
yield on other bonds. Thereafter,
the yields on all short-term bonds
would move in tandem.
Table 1
Likely Effects of the Switch
To a Consumption Tax
Near term Long term
Investment + +
Capital stock 0 +






right, there can be
little doubt that the
consumption tax is
an idea whose time
has come.”8
The current return on a 30-year
bond is an average of the one-year
returns expected over the next 30
years. Therefore, if people think
that either a national sales tax or
the Armey flat tax is coming, a
gradual closing of the gap between
long-term Treasury and long-term
municipal bond yields should
already be apparent. There should
be no corresponding closure of the
gap between short-term Treasury
and short-term municipal bond
yields until reform is imminent.
The behavior of municipal bond
yields relative to Treasury bond
yields suggests that traders began
taking the possibility of compre-
hensive tax reform seriously follow-
ing the appointment of Jack Kemp
(R-New York) to chair a reform
commision (Chart 2). At the long
end of the maturity spectrum,
recent months have seen the per-
centage gap between 30-year
Treasury bond yields and 30-year
municipal bond yields cut in half,
from 20 percent to 10 percent.
However, no change in tax regime
is expected until after the 1996
elections: no shrinkage of the yield
gap is yet apparent for bonds that
mature before November 1996.
The Politics of Tax Reform: Winners
and Losers. The vast majority of
people would gain from the switch
to a consumption tax. But the gains
would not be distributed evenly,
and—especially in the years imme-
diately following reform—some
people would suffer net losses.
Risky new businesses in high-
growth, capital-intensive industries
would be clear winners from tax
reform. These firms would benefit
from the more favorable treatment
of equity finance and the increased
flow of savings provided by a con-
sumption tax. Holders of existing
municipal bonds would be short-
term losers under the national sales
tax or Armey flat tax because these
plans remove current tax prefer-
ences for municipal bonds. (The
USA tax plan would remove the tax
preference for new municipal bonds
but retain it for existing bonds.)
People who live in high-tax areas—
like New England and the Great
Lakes region—are also hurt by tax
reform in the short run because they
lose their ability to deduct state and
local income and property taxes.
Similarly, homeowners would likely
find that the fall in long-term inter-
est rates caused by tax reform
would not, at first, fully offset the
elimination of the mortgage interest
and property tax deductions.
Conclusion
The choice between the current
U.S. income tax and a consumption
tax is like the choice a family makes
when deciding whether to trade in
its 5-year-old car for a new model
in its first year of production. The
new model has no track record. Its
handling might take some getting
used to, and buying it would mean
pulling together a down payment.
On the other hand, it has an engine
that is more powerful, more effi-
cient, and easier to repair and main-
tain. The performance of the older
vehicle has been slowly deteriorat-
ing, and the car needs more and
more repair. While there’s room
for disagreement on exactly which
options package is right, there can
be little doubt that the consumption
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oes a country’s exchange rate
policy influence its economic
prosperity? This and other issues
were addressed during the Federal
Reserve Bank of Dallas’ September
14–15 conference, “Exchange
Rates, Capital Flows and Monetary
Policy in a Changing World
Economy.” An important focus of
the conference was what countries
should think and do about ex-
change rates. For example, a coun-
try can fix its exchange rate, as
most industrial countries, including
the United States, did under the
Bretton Woods system for 25 years
after World War II. The other
extreme among foreign exchange
choices is to let the rate float, as the
United States has more or less done
since 1972. A third option for
countries is a policy somewhere in
between that’s aimed at controlling
exchange rate movements within
predefined limits.
Do Exchange Rates Make a Difference?
Some economists have argued
that nominal exchange rates, those
quoted in the daily newspapers,
have few effects on the real eco-
nomy. In the 1970s, economist
Milton Friedman advocated floating
nominal exchange rates instead of
fixed rates. Friedman argued that
floating rates would adjust to eco-
nomic activity and let markets
operate more efficiently. Friedman
and others believed that only
changes in real exchange rates—
those adjusted for price changes in




argued that changes in nominal ex-
change rates would not affect real
exchange rates. Prices would ad-
just to offset changes in the nom-
inal rate. Suppose that France had a
small devaluation of the nominal
exchange rate against the dollar, so
that the dollar bought a few more
francs after the devaluation. Ac-
cording to the argument, if a nomi-
nal devaluation occurred, France’s
domestic prices would increase to
offset the exchange rate move. As
an example, if the exchange rate
went from 5 to 6 French francs per
dollar, sellers might adjust by push-
ing up French wine prices from 25
francs to 30. A 25 franc bottle of
wine with a 5 franc per dollar ex-
change rate is $5. A 30 franc bottle
of wine at a 6 franc per dollar ex-
change rate is still $5, even though
a dollar now buys 6 francs instead
of 5. That is why a nominal devalu-
ation would have no effect on the
real, inflation-adjusted exchange
rates, and there would be no real
effects on the economy.
However, if a nominal devalua-
tion occurred without an offsetting
increase in France’s prices, there
would be real effects. A 20-percent
Exchange Rates,
Capital Flows and
Monetary Policy in a
Changing World Economy
devaluation of the franc with no
change in the franc price of French
wine, for example, would mean
French wine would be 20 percent
cheaper in dollars. Americans
would most likely buy more French
wine and less California wine.
That would be a real effect. This
scenario more closely resembles
how things really work.
The relationship between the
U.S. dollar and the Canadian dollar
illustrates how changes in nominal
rates affect real rates. Chart 1 is a
plot of the Canadian dollar/U.S.
dollar nominal and real exchange
rates during a period of fixed
exchange rates—the late 1960s
and very early 1970s—and during
a period of floating rates—1972
to the present. If changes in the
nominal exchange rate had no
effect on the real exchange rate,
the real rate on this chart would
stay flat around zero, no matter
how much the nominal rate
changed. But that is not what
happened. When Canada fixed its
nominal exchange rate in the
1960s, real exchange rate volatility
declined. But when the Canadians
floated their dollar in 1972, real
exchange rate volatility also rose.
Thus, when the nominal exchange
rate moved around a lot, so did the
real rate. Clearly, nominal exchange





















Canadian Dollar–U.S. Dollar Nominal and Real Exchange Rates
Percent changes10
Floating Exchange Rates
Despite this finding, many con-
ference speakers expressed support
for floating exchange rate systems,
citing several advantages. Speaker
Michael Dooley, professor of eco-
nomics at the University of Califor-
nia at Santa Cruz, argued that a
fixed exchange rate regime gives
short-term insurance for investors.
By using a floating rate, these
investors bear more investment
risk. The result is less movement of
the hot in-and-out money some
analysts accuse of disrupting many
developing economies.
Another advantage of floating
rates is they are less likely to move
so far out of line with economic
fundamentals as to create sudden
megadevaluations. For example,
the Mexican peso’s overvaluation
and subsequent crash could have
been avoided with a floating ex-
change rate. Moreover, it may be
more difficult today to maintain an
overvalued exchange rate with the
large size of international capital
movements and new innovations,
such as derivatives. Conference
speaker Peter Garber of Brown
University showed how derivatives
could render some standard tools
for defending a currency, such as
raising interest rates to attract new
capital, completely ineffective in
some cases.
Floating exchange rates also
have their problems. Speaker Jeff
Frankel of the University of Califor-
nia at Berkeley noted that floating
exchange rates have tended to be
very volatile, and their volatility
may also discourage trade. Vittorio
Corbo of the Catholic University of
Chile observed that exchange rate
volatility may hamper international
investment because it makes it more
risky. When investment slows, so
does overall economic growth.
Frankel also explained that exchange
rate fluctuations may cause an ex-
change rate bubble. Bubbles de-
velop when speculators, thinking
that a move in a certain direction
might continue, bet on the trend no
matter how far out of line with
economic fundamentals it actually
is. This progressively wider wedge
between the exchange rate and
economic fundamentals eventually
gets corrected, with negative reper-




rates—those that are pegged at a
constant rate, allowed to crawl at a
preannounced rate or allowed to
fluctuate within a band—received a
lot of interest in the 1980s, as
World Bank economist Sebastian
Edwards pointed out. Many people
thought that controlled rates could
serve as an anchor that tethered
domestic prices to international
prices by targeting the exchange
rate. The idea was that managed
exchange rates would serve as part
of a credible anti-inflation policy.
Countries with pegged exchange
rates, it was believed, would be
less likely to dare to expand their
money stocks at a faster rate than
the countries to which their ex-
change rates were pegged. Doing
so would mean that the exchange
rate would have to be abandoned.1
However, fixed exchange rates
have their own their problems, as
many conference participants
pointed out. Fixed exchange rates,
or even currency boards, are not as
immutable as some might believe.
The collapse of the European
exchange rate mechanism and the
Mexican peso are two examples.
Also, Peter Garber argued that it is
getting even harder for countries to
defend a fixed rate from speculative
attacks and bubbles. Sooner or
later, these attacks always seem to
come if the exchange rate does not
match the economic fundamentals.
Finally, countries that use the
exchange rate as a nominal anchor
against inflation rarely reduce their
inflation rates to the level of the
country whose currency they’re
pegged to. This can lead to a serious
overvaluation, which is what hap-
pened in Mexico. Although exchange
rate policy contributed to a drastic
drop in Mexican inflation, it was not
enough to match U.S. inflation. Be-
cause inflation in Mexico grew faster
than the exchange rate, Mexican
products became expensive relative
to U.S. goods. Mexican imports
rose and capital inflows fell. The
result was a balance of payments
crisis, an attack on the currency
and a large, disruptive devaluation.
Conclusion
One consensus of the confer-
ence was that, despite valid circum-
stances for managing exchange rate
movements, floating rates appear to
be a more practical policy. The
strongest case for fixed exchange
rates could be made for very small
and very open economies, such as
Panama or Bermuda. But even in
these cases, periodic exchange rate
adjustment could be necessary.
Participants wholeheartedly re-
jected a return to the Bretton Woods
system of fixed exchange rates.
Also rejected was explicit monetary
coordination between countries if it
meant domestic concerns would
take a back seat to international
objectives. The consensus generally
was that countries should look
toward domestic stability as their
objective, which would reduce





1 For small countries, Steve Hanke of
Johns Hopkins University and Allan
Meltzer of Carnegie Mellon University
both endorsed something even stron-
ger—a currency board. Steve Hanke
argued that this currency arrangement
would ultimately lead to more stable
financial markets. For a more detailed
analysis of currency boards, see Carlos
Zarazaga, “Can Currency Boards Prevent
Devaluations and Financial Meltdowns?”
Southwest Economy, Issue 4, 1995.
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Regional Update
FURTHER INFORMATION ON THE DATA
For more information on employment data,
see “Reassessing Texas Employment Growth”
(Southwest Economy, July/August 1993). For
more information on TIPI, see “The Texas Indus-
trial Production Index” (Dallas Fed Economic
Review, November 1989). For more information
on the Texas Leading Index and its components,
see “The Texas Index of Leading Indicators:
A Revision and Further Evaluation” (Dallas Fed
Economic Review, July 1990).
Online economic data and articles are avail-
able on the Dallas Fed’s electronic bulletin board,
Fed Flash (214) 922-5199 or (800) 333-1953.
REGIONAL ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Texas Employment Total Nonfarm Employment
Texas Private
Leading TIPI Construc- Manufac- Govern- service- New
Index total Mining tion turing ment producing Texas Louisiana Mexico
12/95 — — 154.5 428.3 1,040.4 1,469.8 5,083.4 8,176.4 1,809.0 709.4
11/95 111.5 119.2 154.5 423.4 1,036.9 1,467.9 5,066.0 8,148.7 1,805.4 705.2
10/95 112.5 119.5 155.7 421.9 1,033.6 1,464.4 5,045.6 8,121.2 1,803.8 700.1
9/95 113.1 119.5 155.9 417.7 1,033.1 1,469.0 5,025.9 8,101.6 1,800.3 694.9
8/95 113.1 119.9 155.2 411.6 1,032.0 1,469.8 5,005.3 8,073.9 1,791.2 691.1
7/95 112.9 120.0 155.6 409.3 1,029.7 1,461.9 4,987.7 8,044.2 1,786.8 690.3
6/95 112.5 119.3 156.8 408.2 1,030.2 1,455.3 4,970.1 8,020.6 1,787.6 686.6
5/95 112.3 119.1 156.9 407.0 1,029.5 1,446.7 4,960.9 8,001.0 1,786.5 686.5
4/95 111.2 118.8 156.1 402.2 1,031.3 1,443.7 4,943.7 7,977.0 1,783.2 685.8
3/95 110.1 118.7 156.8 405.8 1,032.0 1,441.4 4,943.1 7,979.1 1,784.4 685.3
2/95 111.1 119.1 157.3 405.7 1,029.9 1,438.4 4,931.1 7,962.4 1,782.4 684.3
  1/95 110.4 118.9 157.6 401.7 1,026.6 1,433.4 4,914.4 7,933.7 1,781.8 681.5
The Eleventh District economy grew
at a healthy pace in the fourth quarter of
1995. Fourth-quarter data showed that
employment growth slowed in Louisiana,
accelerated in New Mexico and remained
quite strong in Texas. In early January,
Beige Book respondents reported con-
tinued economic expansion but at a more
moderate pace. Recent movements in
leading economic indicators also sug-
gest that the District economy is likely
to grow at a slightly slower pace in
1996 than in 1995.
District nonfarm employment increased
at a 3.8-percent annual rate in the fourth
quarter, a healthy increase from the 2.8-
percent annual average during the first
nine months of 1995 but slower than the
very strong 4.8-percent posted in 1994.
Employment growth was concentrated
in the private sector, which grew at a
4.5-percent annual rate in the fourth
quarter, up from the 2.8-percent annual
rate of the first nine months of the year.
In contrast, the volatile government
sector grew at 0.7-percent annual rate
in the fourth quarter, after posting a
2.8-percent growth rate in the first nine
months of 1995.
Fourth-quarter employment grew
strongly in construction, trade, business,
health and transportation industries.
Trucking deregulation, which took effect
in January 1995, likely contributed to the
pickup in transportation industry jobs in
Texas. District construction activity con-
tinued to increase at a healthy pace. Con-
struction employment increased strongly
Total Nonfarm Employment
Index, January 1991 = 100
Texas Industrial Production Index
Texas Leading Index and Nonfarm Employment
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Data not available
in the fourth quarter, jumping 12.2 per-
cent. Recent gains in housing permits
suggest continued strength in home
building over the next several months.
Employment continued to decline in
apparel and transportation equipment
and posted anemic growth in finance
and real estate. Texas industrial produc-
tion declined in November due to de-
clines in mining and utilities.
While prospects remain good for the
Eleventh District, the January Beige Book
suggests three trends that might dampen
growth in 1996. First, contacts expressed
concern about less stimulus from a
slower growing national economy.
Second, labor market tightness is re-
ported to have recently begun to push
up wages. Finally, an expected consoli-
dation of retailers might slow employ-
ment growth in that sector as well as
nonresidential construction.
—Keith R. PhillipsLook for Southwest Economy
on the world wide web…
http://www.dallasfed.org
Southwest Economy and much of the data used to produce it are available on FedDallas, the Dallas Fed home page. This and other Dallas Fed
publications are online in text and PDF formats, along with hundreds of other useful files, such as...
• Banking research and instructions for corporations wishing to file applications with Dallas Fed regulators.
• Texas economic data, including the Texas Industrial Production Index and Texas Index of Leading Indicators.
• Information about the Center for Latin American Economics.
• The Dallas Fed’s exchange rate measure, Trade-Weighted Value of the Dollar.
• Links to other Federal Reserve sites and sites related to economics, finance and policy issues.
• Frequent updates and additions.
Best of all, FedDallas e:mail lets Southwest Economy readers comment on articles, critique the site and suggest future improvements. Stop by soon.
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